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Drawing upon the knowledge-based view theory, knowledge can be considered the most 
important strategic resource for companies and the foundation for innovation and growth. 
However, especially incumbents struggle to create new innovations internally and thus, 
increasingly search for tools to source external knowledge for the firm. Corporate venture 
capital (CVC) investments are one way to access new knowledge, capabilities and technologies 
to drive innovation within companies. Using a panel dataset of 66 individual corporate investors 
with more than 400 observations, this paper explores the impact of CVC deals on the investor’s 
innovativeness and investigates circumstances influencing the relationship. This research finds 
a positive relationship between corporate venture capital deals and the investor’s 
innovativeness, measured by patent applications. Furthermore, this study finds empirical 
evidence that the relationship between CVC deals and the corporate investor’s innovativeness 
is stronger when investors invest in startups in an early development stage, as their knowledge 
is more disruptive and valuable for the incumbent. Last, this paper does not find a significant 
moderating effect of geographic proximity on the relationship between corporate venture 
capital and innovation. The spatial distance of an investment does not seem to be a crucial 
determinant for the success of corporate venture capital deals, supporting the arguments of 
authors proclaiming a “death of geography”.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent trends such as digitalization, rapid technological change, increasing levels of 
competition and correspondingly shorter product life cycles threaten existing market positions 
of incumbent firms. As a response to these trends, companies realize that creating a continuous 
stream of innovations is essential to stay profitable and to maintain a competitive advantage 
(Artz et al., 2010). Joseph Schumpeter (1934) argues that firms have to innovate to survive and 
to be successful in the long run. He highlights that if incumbents are not able to adjust their 
business models to changes in the environment, there is a high chance that they will be replaced 
by disruptive new entrants.  
Furthermore, Henderson (1993) outlines that especially large and established firms face 
difficulties to generate new innovations internally. Innovations can be defined as “new 
combinations of new or existing knowledge, resources, equipment, and other factors” 
(Schumpeter, 1934, p.65) with the attempt to commercialize it. The reason many incumbents 
fail to internally create innovations is that they lack dynamic capabilities and struggle to adapt 
to changes in technologies and markets (Henderson, 1993). Moreover, Tidd and Bessant (2009) 
argue that incumbents, which often have bureaucratic structures, do not possess the 
entrepreneurial spirit to foster radical innovation and that these structural deficiencies hamper 
the innovation process. To compensate, incumbents do not only seek to create new knowledge 
through research and development (R&D) but also search for new knowledge or technologies 
from outside the boundaries of the firm (Caloghirou, Kastelli & Tsakanikas, 2004). 
This draws upon the knowledge-based view (KBV) theory, which deems knowledge to be 
the most important strategic resource for companies and the foundation for a competitive 
advantage (Grant, 1996; Kohlbacher, 2007; Curado & Bontis, 2006). The KBV theory can be 
regarded as an extension of the resource-based view, considering knowledge as a special 
resource that does not depreciate but accumulates over time, contrarily to other economic 
productive factors (Curado & Bontis, 2006). Today, there is common ground in the literature 
that knowledge is an important driver to create innovation and to stimulate economic growth 
(Howells, 2002). The KBV theory and Schumpeter’s thoughts outlined above, demonstrate the 
importance of knowledge and innovation for large corporations and that gathering and using 
new sources of knowledge should be deeply ingrained in a company’s strategy.  
There are generally two ways for corporations to source new knowledge and to develop new 
capabilities, serving as a prerequisite for innovation. In particular, knowledge can be created 
internally through R&D initiatives or can be externally acquired and incorporated into the 
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innovation units of the firms. Access to external knowledge usually occurs through three 
different means: strategic alliances such as joint ventures, joint development agreements or 
technology-sharing initiatives, mergers & acquisitions (M&A) or corporate venture capital 
investments (De Man & Duysters, 2005). This paper sheds light on the impact of CVC 
investments on the investor’s innovativeness and examines two factors influencing the strength 
of the relationship. The other two means, strategic alliances and M&A, are not in the scope of 
the study.  
Corporate venture capital can be defined as “equity investment by incumbent firms in 
independent entrepreneurial ventures, i.e., relatively new, not-publicly-traded companies that 
are seeking capital to continue operation” (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005, p. 615). A fundamental 
difference between independent venture capital (IVC) and CVC is the purpose of the 
investment. While IVC firms primarily target positive financial returns, CVC investors are 
additionally looking for strategic benefits to the parent company (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006). 
This is the reason why CVC investments possess on average longer investment durations than 
IVC investments (Guo, Lou & Perez-Castrillo, 2015). In surveys, corporate managers were 
asked to rank the primary objectives for investing CVC in startups. The survey revealed that 
the ability to gain knowledge about new technologies and markets was ranked highest among 
all proposed goals (Alter & Buschbaum, 2000).  
Furthermore, Amin and Wilkenson (1999) argue that there is a “rediscovery of competences 
as determinants of economic performance” (p.121). Social scientists realize that a central 
element to determine the long-term success of incumbents is the firm’s ability to generate and 
secure knowledge and to continuously learn. One significant aspect of organizations’ 
competences to be successful is the ability to access and incorporate externally derived 
knowledge. However, for a long time in research, there has been a debate on whether internally 
generated knowledge through R&D is sufficient for companies to successfully innovate or 
whether internal firm knowledge should be paired with external knowledge from e.g. startup 
companies (Sahaym, Steensma & Barden, 2010). These authors argue that there is a 
complementary effect between R&D and CVC, stating that the more R&D spending, the more 
CVC investments because companies better realize the potential of exploiting the investments 
and that the interplay between both significantly improves innovation performance. This is in 
line with open innovation literature. Chesbrough (2003) recognizes a shift from internal 
knowledge creation or closed systems of innovation towards more open systems, in which 
multiple participants engage collaboratively in innovation. In an open system, firms incorporate 
both internal and external knowledge to drive innovation and to maximize value for the firm. 
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First, this paper elaborates on the overarching problem statement of this research and 
introduces the corresponding research questions. Second, existing literature is reviewed and 
hypotheses are derived from the theory. Third, the methodology to test the hypotheses is 
outlined, including the data collection process, the research method and the research design. 
Fourth, results from the multivariate analysis are presented. Last, this paper concludes with a 
discussion and managerial implications and highlights some limitations of the empirical study.  
 
2. Problem Statement and Research Questions 
 
With a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 21.64% in global CVC deals and a global 
CVC investment funding CAGR of 37.97% over the last 5 years, CVC is becoming increasingly 
important to many firms as a source of knowledge to foster innovation (see Figure 1). Global 
CVC activity even accelerated to an all-time high in 2018, emphasizing that CVC investments 
become more and more part of corporate strategies. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Annual global disclosed CVC deals and funding, 2013 –2018. From “The 2018 
Global CVC Report” by CBInsights (2019) 
 
The ability of firms to use and develop innovative capabilities is nowadays commonly 
recognized as one of the most crucial determinants for firm performance and competitive 
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advantage (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). However, CVC is a relatively new and emerging 
phenomenon, which becomes increasingly important to large corporations around the world as 
shown in the graph (see figure 1) above.  
Due to this growing recognition, CVC investments receive more and more attention in the 
empirical literature as external knowledge sourcing vehicle (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). 
However, the research field of corporate venture capital is still less examined than that of IVC 
as well as other tools to gather knowledge for firms. So far, many studies focused on finding 
empirical evidence for external knowledge acquisition means such as joint ventures, mergers 
& acquisitions and strategic alliances (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; De Man & Duysters, 
2005). This research attempts to fill this gap in empirical literature by investigating CVC 
investments as a tool for external knowledge acquisition for companies. Therefore, the 
following problem statement is examined in this paper: 
 
Problem Statement: What is the impact of corporate venture capital deals on the 
innovativeness of the investor?  
 
Although research about corporate venture capital is growing, the understanding of 
circumstances that influence the relationship between CVC and the investor’s innovativeness 
is lacking consistency and depth. There are mainly three streams of literature that examine 
moderating factors in the context of CVC and innovation. These areas of research deal with (1) 
the environment, in which the investment occurs, (2) multiple facets of relatedness and 
proximity between the investor and the startup company and (3) characteristics and capabilities 
of the incumbent. More specifically, researchers looked at moderating factors, including (1) 
weak vs. strong intellectual property environments (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Dushnitsky & 
Shaver, 2009), (2) technological, strategic and industrial relatedness (Chemmanur, Loutskina 
& Tian, 2012; Yang Narayanan, & Zahra, 2009) geographic, organizational and cognitive 
proximity between the corporate investor and the startup (Howells, 2002; Boschma, 2005, 
Morgan, 2004; Han, Tsou & Clarke, 2017; Tian, 2010), (3) absorptive capacity capabilities of 
the incumbent (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Campo & Ayala, 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), 
governance modes (Keil et al., 2008) and preferred investment stages (Matusik & Fitza, 2012; 
Yang, Narayanan & Zahra, 2009; Keil, Zahra & Maula, 2004; Wadhwa, Phelps & Kotha, 2010). 
However, the findings in these areas of research are inconsistent. Especially, literature about 
geographic proximity is twofold. While Howells (2002) and Morgan (2004) argue that the 
spatial distance between investors and entrepreneurial ventures should be minimized to ensure 
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and facilitate tacit knowledge spillovers, other authors devalue the impact of geographic 
locations on knowledge transfer. Han, Tsou & Clarke (2017) argue that through the Internet as 
a tool of global mass communication, a “death of geography” occurred and that geographic 
proximity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowledge transfer (Boschma, 
2005).  
Furthermore, existing literature about the optimal investment stage for corporate investors 
is lacking consistency. Wadhwa, Phelps and Kotha (2010) argue that the later a corporate 
investor invests, the easier is the knowledge transfer, as startups have a much better 
understanding of their businesses and technologies. Contrarily, Chesbrough & Tucci (2002) 
highlight that early stage ventures provide investors with more groundbreaking information 
about new technologies from the market. Although early stage investments are characterized 
by more uncertainty and a higher level of risk, the authors emphasize that knowledge at this 
stage is more disruptive and offers more radical opportunities to the incumbent. 
This study sheds light on the problem statement outlined above and the controversies with 
regards to the optimal investment stage and the geographic proximity between corporate 
investors and startups and investigates the following three research questions: 
 
Research Question I: To what extent do corporate venture capital investments of 
incumbents enhance the innovativeness of the investor? 
 
Research Question II: How does the geographic proximity between the corporate investor 
and the investment target influence the relationship between corporate venture capital 
investments and the investor’s innovativeness? 
 
Research Question III: How does the investment stage influence the relationship between 
corporate venture capital investments and the investor’s innovativeness? 
 
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, this research extends 
the corporate entrepreneurship literature by examining the effect of CVC investments on the 
innovativeness of the investing firm. Furthermore, this paper explores different circumstances 
shaping this relationship and sheds light on contradicting streams of the literature regarding 
moderating factors. Second, the knowledge-based view literature is augmented by analyzing 
the effect of external knowledge acquisition on the investor’s innovation activities in the context 
of CVC and by investigating the role of geographic proximity as a facilitator for tacit knowledge 
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spillovers. Third, this study contributes to the real options theory by exploring the effect of 
investment stages as a factor, influencing the relationship between CVC and the investor’s 
innovativeness. Finally, this research provides practitioners with managerial guidance on what 
to consider when investing capital in startup companies. 
 
3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
Existing challenges of our time force incumbents to rethink their business models and 
innovation strategies. This chapter incorporates different streams of literature and introduces 
existing theory with regard to CVC and its impact on the investor’s innovativeness. Moreover, 
the reasoning of geographic proximity and investment stage as moderating variables are 
examined. From this theory, three hypotheses are drawn. 
 
3.1 Corporate venture capital and innovation 
 
As corporate venture capital becomes increasingly important to many incumbents around 
the world, the academic interest in this subject has risen. Drawing upon the knowledge-based 
view theory, knowledge is considered to be the most important strategic resource for 
companies, as it strengthens a firm’s market position and can lead to a competitive advantage 
(Grant, 1996). However, Kogut and Zander (1992) argue that to be able to sustain the 
competitive advantage, knowledge has to be constantly extended and renewed. Henderson 
(1993) outlines that an incumbent’s capability to internally develop new knowledge is limited. 
He argues that purely relying on R&D as the main source of innovation is not sufficient in 
today’s dynamic world to maintain its competitive position. Therefore, companies should look 
outside the boundaries of the firm in order to find additional sources of radical knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). CVC is one promising source and opportunity to access new 
knowledge and to learn from entrepreneurial ventures (Keil, Zahra & Maula, 2004). 
Entrepreneurs often actively seek corporate investors as strong partners because they benefit 
from funding, value-added services and access to additional product markets (Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2005). In return, ventures are willing to grant access to their operations, technologies 
and specialized know-how. Thus, the authors describe corporate venture capital as a “useful 
learning investment strategy” (Lee & Kang, 2015, p.349) to create more technological options 
for the future. 
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Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) identify three ways of how new knowledge is transferred from 
the venture into the firm and how interorganizational learning is created through CVC. First, 
before funding a venture, investors generally conduct due diligences of a startup’s operations 
and business plan. This procedure involves background checks of the founders, reviews of the 
product and services as well as conversations with consumers. For this process, executives call 
on the help of R&D departments, which support in evaluating technologies, market risk and 
business potential. This knowledge gathering and exchanging approach leads to more 
dedication and awareness for future technologies as well as to better communication and 
cooperation within the company (Chesbrough, 2002). Therefore, this procedure is an enormous 
opportunity for the incumbent to learn even before the capital commitment. Second, firms learn 
from entrepreneurial ventures after the investment has taken place. It is common in the startup 
ecosystem that corporate investors occupy board seats in the invested firms, which provide 
managers with additional insights and knowledge about the venture and its technologies from 
within the firm. Furthermore, incumbents start establishing business functions in their 
corporations to ensure continuous knowledge exchange between investor and venture. Last, 
incumbents learn from the failing of ventures. Even startup failures provide investors with 
profound knowledge and learnings about technologies and markets that should not be further 
pursued (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). 
Research shows that CVC does not only yield superior financial performance (Dushnitsky 
& Lenox, 2006) but also leads to better strategic decisions (Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). Scholars 
found multiple reasons why this is the case. First, corporate investors gain new insights about 
recent technology developments from the market (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2002). Startups are 
usually faster in discovering new and disruptive innovation, which opens a “window on new 
technologies” (Benson & Zedonis, 2009, p.329) and learning for the company. Corporations 
can use that information and integrate it into their own innovation system. Second, as Maula, 
Keil & Zahra (2013) outline, CVC investments can serve as an alert mechanism to detect 
technological discontinuities. Technological discontinuities are “fundamental shifts from one 
technology to another” (Maula, Keil & Zahra, 2013, pp. 926-927) and threaten the incumbents’ 
strong market positions. Through the use of CVC, investors become more aware of 
technological shifts and recognize the need to solve them. Third, the sourcing of external 
knowledge helps corporations to better exploit internal knowledge creation, as communication, 
collaboration and interorganizational learning are enhanced (Sahaym, Steensma & Barden, 
2010).  
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Therefore, it seems that incumbents, which invest in startups increase their knowledge stock 
and improve their innovation activities. It is assumed that the larger the investor’s equity 
investments, the greater the knowledge stock the investor gains access to. There are two ways 
of how a knowledge base can be extended. It can either grow through investments in a variety 
of different entrepreneurial ventures or through higher stakes in the individual portfolio 
companies. The latter provides corporate investors with additional power and consequently, 
admission to more in-depth knowledge of the startup (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). Moreover, 
the more knowledge a corporate investor accesses, the more innovation output is generated 
from a new combination of exisiting knowledge or from entirely new innovative solutions.  
From this reasoning, it seems that investments in entrepreneurial ventures are strongly 
related to superior innovation performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is drawn: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between corporate venture capital 
investments and the investor’s innovativeness. 
 
3.2 The moderating role of investment stage 
 
Investing in entrepreneurial ventures is a risky and uncertain commitment. Generally, 
venture capital literature clusters startups into four development stages, in which firms can 
invest (Buzzacchi, Scellato & Ughetto, 2015). These four stages include the seed stage, the 
early stage, the expansion stage and the late stage. According to Matusik & Fitza (2012), 
investment stages are directly related to different levels of uncertainty. Investing in seed or 
early stage startups involves much more market and technological uncertainty, compared to 
investments in the expansion or late stage (Yang, Narayanan & Zahra, 2009; Van de Vrande & 
Vanhaverbeke, 2012). Sources of uncertainty may include the unawareness of managers or 
consumers about specific technologies, the missing proof of the startup’s technology on the 
market and a lack of expertise and skills on how to use and apply new technologies. 
One financial theory, which is particularly applicable in the context of corporate venture 
capital and preferred investment stages is the real options theory. As CVC investments in their 
nature are limited commitments to uncertain technologies with the opportunity to invest further 
in the future, real options logic can be applied (Sahaym, Steensma & Barden, 2010). Real 
options represent the value for managers to be flexible in changing or expanding projects based 
on new conditions. These conditions can be of a technological or economic nature or can result 
from changes in the market. Kogut & Kulatilaka (2001) describe real options as a marriage of 
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“the theory of financial options to foundational ideas in strategy, organizational theory and 
complex systems” (p.744). Real options provide managers with the right but not the obligation 
to undertake different actions in the future (Van de Vrande & Vanhaverbeke, 2012). Therefore, 
real options help managers to cope with uncertainty and provide them with the privilege to 
adjust resource commitments if necessary. At the same time, real options decrease downside 
risk, while preserving upside opportunities. However, with regard to the optimal investment 
stage for an incumbent, there are two contradicting streams in the empirical literature.  
On the one hand, Wadhwa, Phelps and Kotha (2010) argue that the later the investment 
stage, the better startups know their businesses and technologies. Consequently, the ability to 
transfer the knowledge from the entrepreneurial venture into the corporate investor firm is 
facilitated. This is in line with Yang, Narayanan and Zahra (2009), who outline that the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures in an early stage is much more difficult to predict. Late 
stage investments present lower uncertainty because some milestones have already been 
achieved and technology might have already proven valuable on the market (Matusik & Fitza, 
2012). Accordingly, the codification of the knowledge from early stage ventures may be less 
valuable to the investor than knowledge codified by late stage startups.  
On the other hand, to benefit from first-mover advantages, incumbents may invest in startups 
at a seed and early stage to source radical and disruptive knowledge. Some corporations favor 
small initial investments in seed and early stage startups with the option to increase the 
investment in the future (Van de Vrande & Vanhaverbeke, 2012). This is in line with the real 
options theory outlined above, which suggests that under high uncertainty, corporate investors 
should make rather small investments. Afterwards, companies can learn from the investments 
and analyze how to reduce the different levels of uncertainty. When levels of uncertainty 
decrease, corporations can reevaluate the business opportunity and can either expand the project 
with a follow up investment or can terminate the commitment. This choice provides managers 
with additional value, arguing in favor of early stage startup investments. Furthermore, 
Chesbrough & Tucci (2002) argue that early stage investments provide incumbents with first-
hand technology information about potential paradigm shifts that are occurring on the market. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is subject to further investigation: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between corporate venture capital investments and the 
investor’s innovativeness is moderated by investment stage. That is, the earlier the investment 
stage, the higher the positive effect of the corporate venture capital investments on the 
investor’s innovativeness.  
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3.3 The moderating role of geographic proximity 
 
Many firms consider knowledge as a key determinant to innovate and to strengthen 
competitive position. Polanyi (1966) classifies knowledge into two different types: explicit and 
tacit knowledge. Knowledge that can be codified and easily transmitted through different 
communication channels is called explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is difficult to formalize 
and is deeply ingrained in the actions and commitment of a person in a specific context.  
Decarolis and Deeds (1999) outline that especially tacit knowledge is often the foundation 
for a sustained competitive advantage, as it is difficult to imitate and to substitute for 
competitors or new market entrants. The uniqueness of that knowledge is often unconsciously 
present in people’s behaviors and actions. Thus, it can only be transmitted through experience 
and interaction. Following this reasoning, incumbents should not only target codifiable 
knowledge but should specifically look out for tacit knowledge within ventures and incorporate 
it into the firm. Howells (2002) argues that to ensure positive spillovers for tacit knowledge, 
the geographic distance between the investor and the startup should be minimized. He outlines 
that geographic proximity becomes an important factor the more tacit components the 
knowledge possesses. As tacit knowledge helps to explain codifiable knowledge, the proximity 
of an investment is a crucial determinant to also facilitate knowledge transfers for explicit 
knowledge. Additionally, Morgan (2004) provides further evidence against the “death of 
geography” theory highlighting that geographic proximity plays a significant role to 
successfully incorporate external knowledge into firms. 
Contrarily, Boschma (2005) studied different types of proximity and their impact of 
knowledge creation and learning. He shows that too much proximity can have negative 
consequences on learning and innovation due to a lack of openness and flexibility. He argues 
that geographic proximity is not a key factor determining of whether the transfer of external 
knowledge successfully leads to innovation, it is more about organizational and cognitive 
proximity between the firms. Further authors argue in favor of the “death of geography” theory, 
questioning the importance of geographic proximity (Han, Tsou & Clarke, 2017). Increasing 
globalization and enhanced technology make the world a smaller place with virtually no 
borders. 
Thus, it is questionable whether the geographic proximity between the investment target and 
the investor plays an important role in transferring the knowledge into the firm. Up to today, 
there is no common ground in the empirical literature that shows whether the geographic 
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distance of the corporate venture capital unit to the investment target has an impact on the 
innovativeness of a firm. Therefore, the following hypothesis is investigated: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between corporate venture capital investments and the 
investor’s innovativeness is moderated by geographic proximity. That is, the closer the investor 
is to the investment receiving firm, the stronger the positive effect of the corporate venture 
capital investment on the investor’s innovativeness. 
 
3.4 Conceptual model 
 
Following the reasoning from above, a conceptual model has been constructed to summarize 
the predicted relationships of this research. The different hypotheses and their expected 
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4. Research Method 
 
The following chapter elaborates on the research method and the research design 
implemented to test the proposed relationships. First, the sample and the data collection process 
are presented. Second, the chapter introduces the measures and variables used to operationalize 
the concepts. Last, the research design is described, including the procedure, which has been 
implemented to test the hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Sample and data collection 
 
To test the research questions and hypotheses, panel data were gathered from different 
sources and combined into one dataset. Panel data incorporate elements of cross-sectional and 
time-series data, as they measure behaviors of particular entities, in this case, corporate investor 
units, across time. For the study, data of corporate venture capital deals were collected from 
Thomson Reuters EIKON database using the PEScreener. After searching the databank for 
CVC investments, the data were particularly filtered for venture capital deals. Data were 
retrieved for investments worldwide from 2010-2017. Additionally, the search was extended 
by using the corporate PE/ venture firm type filter to have a selection of venture capital deals 
only made by corporate investors. In this data collection round, 9452 deals were identified by 
935 individual corporate firms, which invested during this time span. After gathering data from 
Thomson Reuters EIKON, including startup names, investor names, investment years, sum of 
equity invested, number of deals, investment stage of the startup firm at the time of the 
investment and country and continent of the corporate investor and the startup, the data sources 
were combined in one overarching panel dataset.  
As Thomson Reuters’ EIKON database only reports investment units of a corporation 
(example: M12), all units in the dataset were matched with their corporate parent companies 
(example: Microsoft Corporation). This match was implemented through extensive search 
engine research for every individual investment unit. In the next step, the parent companies’ 
names were augmented with individual company identifiers, such as the ISIN code (example: 
US5949181045) and the BvD ID (example: US911144442), the main firm identifier for the 
Orbis databank. Having incorporated the identifiers of the companies in the dataset, patent data 
for the years 2011-2018 were retrieved by PatStat, a worldwide patent database, maintained by 
the European Patent Office. A SQL code was created to facilitate and speed up the search 
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process at PatStat. In the process of cleaning the dataset, pure VC and PE firms as well as other 
funds, such as pension funds, privately held companies and companies having not much 
patenting activity were eliminated from the sample. For this analysis, the sample is limited to 
publicly listed firms, as it ensures accessibility and reliability of financial data. Now, the dataset 
contains corporate venture capital units having a publicly listed parent company and which have 
invested in at least 4 of the 9 years of the time span in the sample. After all adjustments, 66 
corporate venture capital units are left in the sample, including their investment deals between 
2010 and 2017.  
Last, CVC and patent data were augmented with additional public data of the parent 
company, using the BvD ID identifier. Data about total assets, revenue, return on assets and 




4.2.1 Dependent variable: Innovativeness of the investor 
 
Following the existing literature (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Seru, 2010; Lerner, Sørensen 
& Strömberg, 2008), a patent-based metric is used to capture the investor’s innovativeness. For 
a long time in research, patents are argued to be a valid proxy for innovation, as they are unique 
and are considered to be a visible method to codify knowledge transfer. While other authors 
use R&D expenditures (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) or new product announcements (Acs & 
Auretsch, 1988) as a measure for innovation, this paper uses the number of patent applications 
per year as an indicator to capture actual innovation output. According to Griliches (1990), 
patents codify a company’s technological knowledge and potential future invention. Patents are 
a good proxy for innovation because they capture how well a company is able to transform 
internal and external knowledge combined with other innovation inputs into innovation outputs. 
The collected panel dataset contains patent application counts from the years 2011-2018 as a 
dependent variable. However, knowledge creation through CVC does not instantly lead to more 
patenting activity. This paper uses the approach by Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) as well as 
Wadhwa & Kotha (2006) and assumes a one-year time lag between the dependent variable and 
the independent, control and moderating variables. This one-year time lag accounts for the 
administrative time between the acquisition of knowledge and the codification of the patent. 
More specifically, this paper includes each corporate investor (i)’s patenting activity of the year 
(Y+1) (𝑃𝐴𝑇$,&'() and compares it with the independent variables in year (Y).  
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4.2.2 Independent variable: CVC investments 
 
The main independent variable considered in this research is the number of CVC 
investments by each corporate investor (i) in year (Y), represented as a count 
variable	(𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&	). These data are collected from Thomson Reuters EIKON database. 
Each unique investment made in a startup company by a corporate investor between 2010-2017 
in the panel is a count for one CVC deal in that particular year. 
 
4.2.3 Moderating variable: Investment stage 
 
When investing corporate venture capital, an important aspect to consider is the startup’s 
development stage. Thomson Reuters’ EIKON database reports investment stages for every 
unique investment in the databank. Corporate investors have either invested in startups at the 
seed, early, expansion or late stage. The corresponding investment stage is directly related to 
different levels of uncertainty. The more mature the investment stage, the further developed are 
the startups’ processes and the less uncertainty is involved in the investment (Matusik & Fitza, 
2012). Sources of uncertainty may include a lack of knowledge with regards to new 
technologies, markets or consumer acceptance or a lack of specific skills needed to use the 
technology (Gladstone & Gladstone, 2004). To operationalize the variable investment stage, 
the approach by Matusik & Fitza (2012) has been adopted. Each investment in 2010-2017 for 
every corporate investor (i) in year (Y) is categorized in a mutually exclusive group (seed, early, 
expansion and late stage). These categories are treated as an ordinal scale reaching from 1 - 
seed to 4 - late stage. Afterwards, an average per year has been calculated, indicating the 
preferred development stage a CVC firm invests in each year. This builds the foundation for 
the variable (𝐼𝑁𝑉$,&). 
 
(1) Low investment stage: Seed stage  
(2) Moderate investment stage: Early stage  
(3) Advanced investment stage: Expansion stage  
(4) Very high investment stage: Late stage  
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4.2.4 Moderating variable: Geographic proximity 
 
Another variable considered in this study is geographic proximity. More specifically, 
geographic proximity measures the distance between the corporate investor and the investment 
target. Spatial distance is considered a fundamental factor influencing knowledge spillovers 
between corporates and startups (Howells, 2002). Thomson Reuters EIKON database provides 
information about the startup’s and the corporate investor’s country of origin. This information 
is augmented and matched with the continent of origin of both parties involved in the deal. 
Every investment from 2010-2017 received a different category of geographic proximity. The 
values are treated as an ordinal scale reaching from 1 - low proximity to 3 - high proximity of 
the investment. Based on this input an average score for each corporate investor (i) at year (Y) 
has been computed, creating the variable (𝐺𝐸𝑂$,&). 
 
(1) Low Proximity: Corporate investment in a different continent 
(2) Moderate proximity: Corporate investment in the same continent but different country 
(3) High proximity: Corporate investment in the same country 
 
4.2.5 Control variables 
 
To reduce omitted variable bias, a number of control variables have been included in the 
model. In this regard, the approaches of Chemmanur, Loutskina and Tian (2012) and Maula, 
Keil and Zahra (2013) were adopted, who identified a variety of control variables, influencing 
innovation beyond CVC investments. The control variables incorporated into the analysis are 
profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴$,&), firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,&) and R&D intensity (𝑅&𝐷	𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦$,&). First, the 
model controls for the profitability of firms. Highly profitable companies are assumed to 
possess more financial means to invest in innovation, which may positively influence patenting 
activity (Chemmanur, Loutskina and Tian, 2012). Profitability is measured by return on assets 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴$,&) of the corporate investor (i) at year (Y). Second, the model controls for the firm size 
of the corporate investor. Larger corporations are assumed to have more resources and 
experience in their innovation process (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). Firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,&) is 
measured by the total assets of the corporate investor (i) at year (Y). Last, the model controls 
for R&D intensity. This variable (𝑅&𝐷	𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦$,&) captures the corporate investor’s internal 
innovation focus, as it weights how much a firm is willing to invest in innovation and 
technology-related issues (Maula, Keil and Zahra, 2013). R&D intensity is measured as the 
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research and development expenditures to sales ratio of each corporate investor (i) at year (Y). 
Instead of including R&D expenditures as euro amount, this relative measure separates R&D 
effects from company size effects (Maula, Keil & Zahra, 2013). A detailed overview of the 
variables can be found in appendix A (table 5).  
 
4.3 Research design 
 
To test the hypotheses of the research, a panel data regression analysis is conducted. The 
dependent variable (𝑃𝐴𝑇$,&'() is a count variable, takes non-negative integers and does not 
follow a normal distribution. In order to address the discrete nature of the dependent variable, 
two regression types are commonly used in the empirical literature: Poisson regressions or 
negative binomial regressions. While a Poisson regression requires an index of dispersion equal 
to 1 for the dependent variable (Lawless, 1987; Lee et. al., 2011), a negative binomial regression 
assumes the variation of the count variables to be greater than of a true Poisson. Thus, the first 
step in this study is to test which of the two models better fits the data. A likelihood ratio test is 
employed to determine whether the patent count variable suffers from overdispersion. Hinde & 
Demetrio (1998) argue that failing to account for overdispersion underestimates the standard 
error and leads to erroneous inferences of the regression parameters. In the likelihood ratio test, 
the null hypothesis states that the dependent variable is constantly dispersed. The alternative 
hypothesis states that the dependent variable is overdispersed. Having conducted the test at a 
5% significance level, it was found that the null hypothesis can be rejected (p<0.0001) (table 6, 
appendix B). Consequently, it can be confidently stated that the dependent variable suffers from 
overdispersion and that the Poisson regression assumption does not hold true for the observed 
data. Hausman, Hall, & Griliches (1984) argue that in case of an overdispersed dependent count 
variable, a negative binomial regression, which follows a gamma distribution, is the commonly 
used method to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. A negative binomial regression adds an 
individual, unobserved effect to the conditional mean (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). 
Furthermore, this method is widespread in empirical studies with patent counts as dependent 
variables (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; Graves & Langowitz, 1993; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2005, Henderson & Cockburn, 1996). 
Arellano (2009) outlines that the advantage of applying a negative binomial regression is the 
possibility to account for unobserved heterogeneity. This unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity may come from differences in firm characteristics or from yearly variations of 
the data, which further influence the response variable. The most common way to account for 
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this is to control for fixed or random effects. While in fixed effects models, the error term is 
allowed to be correlated with the observed variables, in random effects models the unobserved 
variables are assumed not to be associated with the observed variables (Williams, 2018). To 
investigate which model better fits the data, a Hausman test was conducted (Hausman, Hall, & 
Griliches, 1984). As the Hausman test was significant at a 5% significance level (p<0.0001) 
(table 7, appendix C), a fixed effect negative binomial regression seems to be the appropriate 
model for this research. 
More specifically, as the dataset includes multiple different publicly listed companies over 
an eight-year time period, the findings of the research may be subject to further unobserved 
heterogeneity bias. This bias may be linked to macroeconomic factors, to periods of 
technological ferment (Klevorick et al., 1995) or to differences in firm characteristics 
(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005), influencing the dependent variable. This analysis aims to reduce 
the bias by controlling for year and firm fixed effects. Firstly, year fixed effects control for 
yearly variation of patent application rates as well as macroeconomic issues, such as economic 
downturns. Thus, year dummies are added to the model to control for systematic time period 
effects (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014). Secondly, the model controls for unobserved, time-invariant 
differences in firm characteristics that may impact patenting activity.  
Furthermore, as stated above, the research assumes a one-year time lag between the 
explanatory variables and the response variable. Following the approach from various authors, 
the relationship between the values of the independent variables in year (Y) is compared to the 
patent applications in year (Y+1) (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006; Hall 
& Zedonis, 2001). Moreover, Nadkarni & Chen (2014) argue that including a lagged effect also 
provides more evidence for the causality of the relationship. As learning effects of due 
diligences might occur immediately, knowledge transfers from holding board seats and 
learnings from venture failings may take some time. Moreover, the administrative time between 
the investment and the actual patent application is another reason to incorporate the time lag. 
To summarize, a positive effect of CVC deals is assumed to emerge in the year after the 
investment has taken place.  
The following fixed-effect negative binomial regression model is employed with firm and 
year fixed effects. The expected number of patent applications given for the explanatory 
variables in the fixed effect model may be given by:  
 
E[𝑃𝐴𝑇$,&'(	|	𝑋$,&]	= 𝜆$,&'( = exp	(𝛽𝑋$,& + 𝜖$,& + 𝜈$)	 
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where, 𝑋$,& are time variant regressors, 𝛽 is the coefficient, 𝜖$,& is the idiosyncratic (time 
variant) error term for corporate investors (i) at year (Y) and 𝜈$ is the fixed effect (corporate 
investor time invariant) error term. 
 
More specifically, the following regression equation is estimated by this analysis. 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑇$,&'( = 	 exp	[	𝛽L		+		𝛽(	 ∗ 	𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&	+		𝛽N	 ∗ 	𝐺𝐸𝑂$,&	+		𝛽O	 ∗ 	𝐺𝐸𝑂$,&	 ∗ 	𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&	
+ 		𝛽P	 ∗ 	𝐼𝑁𝑉$,&	 + 	 	𝛽Q	 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑉$,&	 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&	 + 	𝛽R	 ∗ 	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,&	 + 	𝛽S
∗ 	𝑅𝑂𝐴$,&	+		𝛽T	 ∗ 	𝑅&𝐷	𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦$,& + 	𝜀$,&	 + 𝜈$]	 
 
5. Analysis and Results  
 
This chapter includes the empirical analysis of the results. First, descriptive statistics and 
correlations are presented. Second, the outcomes of the fixed effects negative binomial 
regression are discussed and an analysis of the magnitude of the variables in the regression is 
shown. For this purpose, marginal effects are presented using incidence rate ratios (IRR). 
Furthermore, the hypotheses drawn from the literature are analyzed for significance. For all 
tests, Stata 14 has been used as a statistical software tool. 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents some definitions and descriptive statistics. It contains an overview of the 
different variables included in this research. From table 1, it can be observed that corporate 
investors in the sample applied on average for 1,024.25 patents per year. The maximum number 
of patents applied for in one year is 10,165 in the year 2014 by Qualcomm, a multinational 
corporation from the US. Moreover, it can be seen that the dependent variable’s (𝑃𝐴𝑇$,&'() 
standard deviation (1,783.69) is larger than its mean (1,024.25). This provides further evidence 
that the dependent variable is overdispersed and employing a negative binomial regression is 
the appropriate model of analysis. On average, investors in the sample engaged in 6.24 
corporate venture capital deals per year indicating that corporate investors put significant 
attention and financial means into external knowledge generation through CVC. Moreover, the 
mean score for investment stages is 2.8. Compared to the scale midpoint of 2.5, it shows that 
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on average the corporate investors in the sample prefer investments at a rather later stage. In 
respect to geographic proximity, the mean in the sample is 2.25. Compared to the scale midpoint 
of 2, it indicates that the corporate investors in the dataset invest on average in startups that are 
rather close to them.  
The mean for the profitability measure used in this paper (𝑅𝑂𝐴$,&) is 8.7%, varying from  
-23.9% to 31.9%. This shows that some corporate investors in the sample have not been 
profitable during the entire time span of the sample. The mean of total assets of the firms in the 
sample is €83.27bn and ranges from €1.08bn to €748bn. The highest number of total assets in 
the dataset (€748bn) belongs to General Electric, an American conglomerate in 2010. On 
average, the corporate investors in the sample have an R&D intensity of 11.4%, showing that 
in addition to CVC, they also invest significant amounts of their sales back in R&D to drive 
innovation.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
PAT Number of patent applications 
by a firm in year Y+1 
1024.25 1783.69 1 10165 
CVC 
Deals 
Number of CVC investments by 
a firm in year Y 6.236 9.539 1 66 
INV Average investment stage score ranging from 1-4 in year Y 2.797 .666 1 4 
GEO Average geographic proximity score ranging from 1-3 in year Y 2.254 .759 1 3 
ROA Net income to total assets ratio in year Y .087 .064 -.239 .319 
SIZE Total assets of a firm in €Bn in  year Y 83.27 100.17 1.077 747.79 
R&D  
Intensity 
R&D expenditures to sales ratio 
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5.2 Correlations 
 
The correlation matrix for all seven variables included in the analysis is presented in table 2 
below. The correlation values of the predictor variables lie between -0.264 and +0.236. As these 
correlations are not very high, it can be assumed that multicollinearity is not an issue in this 
study. From table 2, a negative correlation between R&D intensity and firm size can be 
observed. This suggests that smaller firms in the sample have a relatively higher R&D to sales 
ratio, compared to larger firm. Furthermore, CVC deals are positively correlated to the 
corporate investor’s innovativeness with a correlation coefficient of 0.506. This result gives a 
first indication that the two variables are somehow related to each other. However, this 
information only emphasizes a co-movement of the two variables and does not tell anything 
about the cause and effect as well as the magnitude of the relationship. Therefore, a panel 
regression analysis should provide further exploration of the relationship.  
Additionally, drawing from the correlation matrix (table 2), it seems that all three control 
variables, 𝑅𝑂𝐴$,&, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,& and 𝑅&𝐷	𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦$,& are related to the investor’s innovativeness. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to control for all three factors in the regression model to receive 
more meaningful results for the other variables.  
 
Table 2: Matrix of correlations  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) PAT Y+1 1.000 
(2) CVC Deals Y .506*** 1.000 
(3) INV Y .133** -.043 1.000 
(4) GEO Y -.092* .101** -.104** 1.000 
(5) ROA Y .171*** .236*** -.088* .014 1.000 
(6) SIZE Y .277*** .068** .144** .039 -.189*** 1.000 
(7) R&D Intensity Y .063* .080* -.137*** -.039 .060* -.264*** 1.000 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
For this research, a fixed effect negative binomial regression is used to test and assess the 
relationships between the variables. Following the approach of existing theory, four models are 
introduced sequentially to better understand the different effects of the variables on the 
dependent variable (Lee & Kang, 2015; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005, Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). 
All four models account for firm fixed effects and include year dummies. A summary of the 
regression results can be found in table 3 below. Wald Chi2 tests are used to check for the 
robustness of the models. All four models of this study are significant at a 1% significance level 
and have high Wald Chi2 scores of above 550, suggesting an overall good model fit. A more 
detailed and individual overview of the regression models can be found in appendix D (tables 
8-11). To analyze the magnitude of the effect of the explanatory variables on the response 
variable, this study follows the approach of the existing literature and conducts an effect 
analysis using incidence rate ratios (Siegel, Ross & King, 2013). This approach is confirmed 
by Buis (2019) and Piza (2012), who state that for non-linear models, incidence rate ratios are 
a commonly used approach to analyze the effect of the independent on the dependent variable.  
The first model of this research is the basic model, in which only the three control variables 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴$,&, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,& and 𝑅&𝐷	𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦$,&) are included. This provides an overview of how the 
control variables impact the dependent variable and why it may be important to include them 
in the model. While the second model adds the main independent variable	(𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&	) to 
the regression equation, model 3 introduces the first moderating variable to the model. Thus, 
for model 3, two additional variables are added, including investment stage (𝐼𝑁𝑉$,&) and the 
interaction term between CVC deals and investment stage (𝐼𝑁𝑉$,& ∗ 	𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&). The last 
additions are the independent variables geographic proximity (𝐺𝐸𝑂$,&) and the respective 
interaction term (𝐺𝐸𝑂$,& ∗ 	𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&), representing model 4.  
Model 1 shows that an investor’s R&D intensity (b=0.901, p<0.01) and firm size 
(b=0.00158, p<0.01) are positively related to the investor’s innovativeness. Both variables are 
significant at a 1% significant level. This is in line with existing research stating that larger 
firms have a higher innovation output, compared to smaller firms (Chemmanur, Loutskina & 
Tian, 2012; Maula, Keil & Zahra, 2013). This seems reasonable, as larger firms have potentially 
more resources to dedicate to innovation and usually possess more experience. Moreover, large 
firms seem to realize that innovation is key to maintain their strong market position, which is 
why they invest many resources to generate innovation.  
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Table 3: Fixed effects negative binomial regression  
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
1Sample size decreases due to missing values 




Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 














































(0.02)   










GEO    -0.042 
(0.04) 
 
GEO * CVC Deals    -0.001 
(0.01) 
 
Firm Effects fixed fixed fixed fixed 
Year Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations1 511 419 413 413 
Firms 66 66 66 66 
Log Likelihood -2761.5635 -2153.6607   -2124.4765 -2123.5838   
Wald Chi2 604.77*** 607.03*** 562.38*** 567.36*** 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Yet, this does not mean that larger firms are more innovative in general, as it does not show 
whether large firms have a higher ratio of innovation output to firm size. However, as firm size 
differences exist, it is important to control for them. Furthermore, companies investing 
significant shares of their sales back in R&D as a source of internal knowledge generation have 
higher patenting activity and are considered to be more innovative than companies that have 
lower R&D to sales ratios. This is in line with existing literature arguing that investments in 
R&D increase the knowledge stock of a firm and impact the innovativeness of the firm 
(Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). Finally, this analysis does not find a detectable effect of 
profitability, measured in terms of return on assets, on the corporate investor’s innovativeness. 
It seems that profitability by itself does not directly influence innovation output. For the other 
three models, model 2-4, similar results are found for the control variables. The control 
variables are added to the model to separate their effects from CVC deals on the dependent 
variable, so that a better understanding of the relationship of the other variables can be 
developed.  
In model 2, the main independent variable 	(𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&	) is introduced, which builds the 
foundation for the analysis of hypothesis 1. As previously outlined, hypothesis 1 states that 
CVC deals are positively related to the investor’s innovativeness. Given the result table 3, it 
can be confidently stated that CVC deals (b=0.007, p<0.05) are positively related to the number 
of patent applications. Hypothesis 1 is supported at a 5% significance level. Thus, external 
knowledge acquisition through corporate venture capital significantly enhances the 
innovativeness of the investor. Through access to startup knowledge, corporate investors are 
able to receive various insights into different new markets and technologies. Investors are able 
to use and incorporate this knowledge and combine it with internally generated R&D 
knowledge to drive innovation. Furthermore, it seems that corporate investors are able to better 
process the knowledge and transform it into innovation output in terms of patent applications. 
Conducting the effect analysis with incidence rate ratios using Stata, the magnitude of this 
relationship can be seen in appendix E (table 12). This study finds that for every additional 
CVC deal, the innovativeness of the corporate investor increases by 3.44%.  
The third model of the research adds the first moderating variable, investment stage (𝐼𝑁𝑉$,&) 
and the interaction variable (𝐼𝑁𝑉$,& ∗ 	𝐶𝑉𝐶	𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠$,&), to the regression equation. Hypothesis 2 
states that the earlier the investment stage of the startup, the higher is the positive effect of CVC 
deals on the innovativeness of the investor. As table 3 shows, the interaction term of investment 
stage and CVC deal has indeed a significant negative impact (b= -0.009, p<0.1) on the positive 
relationship of CVC deals and the innovator’s innovativeness. Hypothesis 2 is supported at a 
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10% significance level. Therefore, it can be stated that, as the phase of development of the 
investment target becomes more mature, the impact on CVC deals on the investor’s 
innovativeness decreases. It seems that knowledge acquired from more mature startups does 
not provide as much value to the corporate investor as the knowledge generated from startups 
in earlier development stages. Thus, it seems that the knowledge gathered is not as disruptive 
and radical, compared to seed or early stage startups and therefore, less innovation output is 
created. The effect analysis using incidence rate ratios shows that for an increase in one scale 
point on the ordinary scale, the relationship of CVC deals and the investor’s innovativeness 
decreases by 0.90% for one additional CVC deal. Thus, it can be stated that when assuming an 
increase of one point on the investment stage ordinary scale, the impact of CVC investments 
on the corporate investor’s innovativeness decreases from 3.44% to 2.54%. This indicates a 
significant negative impact of investment stage with increasing maturity on the relationship 
between CVC and the investor’s innovativeness. 
The last model of this study examines the full model, which includes all variables. 
Hypothesis 3 proposes a positive moderating relationship of geographic proximity on the 
relationship between CVC and the investor’s innovativeness, meaning that the closer the 
corporate investor is to the startup, the stronger the positive relationship between CVC and the 
corporate investor’s innovativeness. From table 3, it can be observed that this research did not 
find a significant moderating effect of geographic proximity on the relationship between CVC 
and patent applications, as the coefficients are not significant. Thus, hypothesis 3 is not 
supported and no direct interpretation can be drawn from these variables. However, it seems 
that geographic proximity does not majorly influence the strength of the relationship between 
CVC deals and the corporate investor’s innovativeness. Table 4 below provides an additional 
overview of the hypotheses and the results of this study.  
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H1: There is a positive relationship between corporate 





H2: The relationship between corporate venture capital 
investments and the investor’s innovativeness is moderated 
by investment stage. That is, the earlier the investment stage, 
the higher the positive effect of the corporate venture capital 




H3: The relationship between corporate venture capital 
investments and the corporation’s innovativeness is 
moderated by geographic proximity. That is, the closer the 
investor is to the investment receiving firm, the stronger the 
positive effect of the corporate venture capital investment on 
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6. Discussion and Managerial Implications  
 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the research and outlines the theoretical 
contribution to the empirical literature. This study extends the existing literature in fields of 
corporate entrepreneurship, knowledge-based view theory and real options theory. 
Furthermore, managerial implications are presented to provide practical guidance to managers 
for future corporate venture capital programs. 
 
6.1 Theoretical contribution 
 
This paper aims to analyze the impact and magnitude of corporate venture capital 
investments on the corporate investor’s innovativeness and explores circumstances that 
influence this relationship. Furthermore, guidance to practitioners is given, so that managers 
are able to adjust their future actions accordingly. These topics are of utmost importance for 
many corporations, as incumbents increasingly seek to access new and disruptive knowledge 
to drive innovation and to maintain their competitive position (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2002). 
Moreover, existing gaps in the literature with regards to geographic proximity (Howells, 2002; 
Morgan, 2004; Boschma, 2005) and the optimal investment stage (Yang, Narayanan & Zahra, 
2009; Keil, Zahra & Maula, 2004, Wadhwa, Phelps & Kotha, 2010; Matusik & Fitza, 2012) are 
analyzed and three hypotheses are drawn from the theory. Thus, this paper contributes to the 
empirical literature by filling these gaps and by shedding light on the theoretical controversies 
outlined in chapter 3 of this study. Specifically, the proposed relationships between variables 
are tested using a panel dataset, containing 66 corporate investors with more than 400 
observations. A negative binomial regression with fixed effects is employed to find empirical 
evidence for the relationships.  
This study supports the results of Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) by finding a significant 
positive relationship between CVC deals in year (Y) and patent applications in year (Y+1). This 
finding augments the existing literature of the knowledge-based view theory because it 
confirms the importance of knowledge as a strategic resource, leading to more innovation 
activities within firms. It provides evidence that gathering knowledge from external 
entrepreneurial ventures significantly impacts the innovation outputs of corporate investors and 
shows that CVC programs play a significant role in successfully driving innovation. This paper 
found that for every additional CVC deal, the investor’s patent application rate increases by 
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3.44%. However, although a significant result for the impact of corporate venture capital deals 
on the investor’s innovativeness is found, the effect seems to be fairly small. This rather small 
effect might exist due to the fact that other external and internal knowledge generation means, 
such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, R&D alliances or other M&A activities also impact 
the patenting activities of incumbents (De Man & Duysters, 2005). Additionally, not all 
innovation activities occurring in firms through CVC are patented (Fontana et al., 2013). Thus, 
this study may underestimate the actual effect of CVC on the innovation activities within firms. 
Furthermore, patent applications are considered to be rather expensive innovation outputs, as 
they are subject to significant patent filing fees, which reduce the motivation to apply for patents 
(European Commission, 2015).  
Nevertheless, it seems that through the access of startup knowledge via CVC investments, 
corporations are able to bring disruptive technological and market knowledge into the firm 
(Chesbrough & Tucci, 2002) and strengthen the corporate investors’ dynamic capabilities. The 
newly acquired knowledge is often used and combined with internal knowledge from R&D 
departments in order to build new innovative solutions (Sahaym, Steensma & Barden, 2010). 
Companies need to realize that the constant renewing and increase of knowledge stock is a 
fundamental factor to enhance innovation activities, which can ultimately lead to a sustained 
competitive advantage (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Overall, this finding highlights the strategic 
importance of CVC programs to incumbents, emphasizing that such programs seem to be 
beneficial to companies to improve their innovation strategies. 
Moreover, this research adds to the existing corporate entrepreneurship literature by 
providing a more detailed investigation of circumstances that shape the relationship between 
corporate venture capital and the investor’s innovativeness. Specifically, this research examines 
the effect of investment stages and geographic proximity on this relationship. A negative 
moderating effect of investment stage maturity on the relationship of CVC and the investor’s 
innovativeness is detected. This study finds empirical evidence that the relationship between 
CVC and the corporate investor’s innovativeness is stronger when investing in rather early stage 
startups. This finding contributes to the real options theory, as although early stage startups are 
associated with more uncertainty, the relationship between CVC on the corporate investor’s 
innovativeness is found stronger, the earlier the development stage of the startup. Although late 
stage startups are associated with less technological and market uncertainty for the corporate 
investor, as some milestones have already been achieved (Wadhwa, Phelps & Kotha, 2010), it 
seems that corporate investors benefit less from the acquired knowledge from startups in late 
development stages. This highlights that the nature of early stage CVC deals as being limited 
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commitments to uncertain technologies does not hinder but promotes the success of CVC 
investments. It seems that the value of a real option to adjust resource commitments when 
necessary at a later stage, significantly impacts the relationship between CVC and the 
innovativeness of the corporate investor. Therefore, companies seem to benefit when investing 
in early startups with the potential option to invest further in the future, as it reduces downside 
risk, while preserving upside opportunity (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). Furthermore, this study 
contributes to the corporate entrepreneurship literature because it provides evidence for the 
magnitude of the relationships. This paper found that for one additional score point on the 
ordinal investment stage scale towards more stage maturity, the relationship between CVC 
deals and the investor’s innovativeness decreases by 0.9% from 3.44% to 2.54%. 
Lastly, this study further contributes to the corporate entrepreneurship literature and to the 
knowledge-based view theory by assessing the influence of geographic proximity on the 
relationship between CVC and the investor’s innovativeness. Hypothesis 3 suggests a positive 
effect of geographic proximity on the relationship of CVC and the corporate investor’s 
innovativeness, as knowledge transfer is assumed to be facilitated when the distance is 
minimized (Howells, 2002; Morgan, 2004). It was argued that especially tacit knowledge can 
be easier transmitted when the corporate investor’s location is close to the venture. However, 
this paper does not find empirical support for hypothesis 3. It seems that the geographic distance 
does not play a fundamental role in impacting the relationship between CVC and the investor’s 
innovation rate. This is in line with the authors arguing in favor of the “death of geography” 
theory (Han, Tsou & Clarke, 2017). It seems that companies are not constrained to source 
knowledge only from startups, which are closely located to the investor but are encouraged to 
source knowledge worldwide and use different kinds of communication technology as tools to 
ensure a smooth knowledge transfer. 
 
6.2 Managerial implications 
 
The findings of the research provide many valuable insights for managers and practitioners 
in the real-world economy. As corporate managers decide how to best allocate resources, CVC 
programs need to become part of corporations’ innovation roadmaps and corporate strategies. 
As corporate venture capital investments significantly increase the investor’s innovation rate 
and complement internal R&D activities, it becomes more and more important to use CVC as 
a tool to maintain a competitive market position. Managers should construct CVC programs 
inside their firms, which do not only provide financing to startups and negotiate the investment 
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terms but also ensure a successful knowledge transfer from the venture into the firm. New 
business functions should be established with a main focus on the incorporation of external 
knowledge into the firm. Furthermore, the corporate investors should select managers to take 
board seats in the invested startups and participate in management meetings to be able to better 
understand the startup’s technologies as well as its day-to-day business and operations. 
Moreover, when it comes to the selection of startups that fit the parent company, this research 
finds evidence that managers should target startups in a rather early stage of development. As 
this study finds a negative moderating effect of mature investments on the relationship of CVC 
and the investor’s innovation rate, knowledge from startups in earlier stages seems to be more 
disruptive and newer to the market, ultimately leading to more innovation activity for the 
corporate investor. To be able to fully exploit the value of real options, managers should 
formulate contracts with startups using series financing, also called investment staging. Series 
A, B or C financing is one way for corporate investors to grow and develop startups by means 
of outside investments. In this case, financing should be provided in successive rounds of 
investment and should be aligned with different milestone achievements (Hill et al., 2009). This 
procedure offers a lot of upside potential, while minimizing downside risk, as a corporate 
investor can only lose the money up to the previous investment. Furthermore, scaling potential 
is virtually unlimited. Following startups through series financing, such as A, B and C should 
be a main goal of managers and should be incorporated in their corporate strategies. This is in 
line with Hill et al. (2009), who found a positive relationship between investment staging and 
CV unit performance. 
 
7. Limitations and Future Research 
 
Although the research was designed to optimize the meaningfulness of the statistical results, 
some limitations should be listed. First, this paper takes the number of patent applications as a 
proxy for innovation. This comes with four main limitations. First, the yearly patent output of 
a firm does not fully reflect the entire knowledge flow from a startup to an investor (Wadhwa 
& Kotha, 2006). Patent counts only capture the codified proportion of knowledge transfer and 
does not distinguish between exploitative innovation and explorative innovation. Furthermore, 
not all patent applications are granted in a later stage and can, therefore, be considered a proper 
patent or innovation (“new combinations of new or existing knowledge”) (Schumpeter, 1934, 
p.65), as it might have already existed. However, it does represent the effort of combining new 
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knowledge and create some kind of tangible output, which is why this research has used it as 
proxy for innovation. Second, as patent applications only measure innovation output, they do 
not tell anything about the quality of the patent. Some highly valued patents are worth more, 
compared to some patents that are not as relevant for companies. To account for this, other 
researchers have used the number of patents cited to give an indication of the importance of the 
patent and to be able to mitigate this issue. However, Hagedoorn & Cloodt (2003) outline that 
both proxies for firm innovativeness are equally feasible to use in the scientific literature, as 
patent citations and patent counts are highly correlated. Third, not all innovations occurring 
within a company are patented (Fontana et al., 2013). Some of the innovation activities 
occurring in firms are not patented, as it might be very hard to copy by competitors or might be 
given to the public to solve a deeper societal issue. Last, the propensity of patents usually varies 
from year to year and from firm to firm. Macroeconomic differences in different years as well 
as firm individual characteristics may impact patenting activity. To reduce this bias, year and 
firm fixed effects have been included in this study (Wadhwa, Phelps & Kotha, 2016). Future 
research can try to replicate the findings of this paper, using different proxies for innovation, 
such as new product announcements or the number of patents cited. This would augment the 
academic literature with further clarity and a better understanding of the relationship between 
corporate venture capital and innovation. Additionally, it would provide more robustness to the 
findings of this research. 
Although this study accounts for differences in firm characteristics and differences in year 
effects, it does not account for unobserved heterogeneity with regard to differences between 
startups. The quality and success of the target investments have not been measured, which may 
also influence the innovation rate of the corporate investor. Future research can further specify 
and dig deeper into the differences in startup quality and may determine specific startup 
characteristics, leading to more innovation activity for the corporate investor. 
Contrarily to other researches (Henderson, 1993; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Wadhwa, 
Phelps & Kotha, 2016), this study has not followed a particular industry-focused approach to 
be able to find more generalized connections across industries and to have a more complete 
dataset. However, this reduces the robustness of the analysis, as this study does not account for 
the unobserved heterogeneity with regards to industry differences (Wadhwa, Phelps & Kotha, 
2016). Future research should do so and account for differences in industry characteristics by 
exploring many different industry types in order to find further proof of the positive relationship 
between CVC and the corporate investor’s innovativeness. 
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Although this study measured the impact of CVC deals and other independent variables on 
firm’s innovation output, it is not clear whether the higher innovation output is beneficial to 
firms or worth the investment. Therefore, future research should test whether the increase in 
innovation activities enhance the overall firm performances (e.g. measured by EBITDA 
margins) 2-3 years after the patents have been filed. 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
The ability to constantly innovate is one of the most crucial determinants for the long-term 
survival of incumbents and can build the foundation for a competitive advantage (Schumpeter, 
1934). To ensure continuous innovation, firms should regularly renew and extent their 
knowledge stock. This study sheds light on one significant tool how new and external 
knowledge can be sourced, leading to more innovation activity. In particular, an analysis of the 
effect of corporate venture capital deals on the patent application rate of large publicly listed 
firms has been conducted. This study finds empirical evidence for a positive relationship 
between corporate venture capital and the corporate investor’s innovativeness. Furthermore, 
this research shows that the effect of the relationship between CVC and patents is greater when 
investing in rather early stage startups. The specific knowledge that is accessed via early stage 
investments is more disruptive and newer to the market and thus, provides more value for 
incumbents. Managers can utilize this study to adapt their established CVC programs or even 
construct a new and sophisticated CVC unit within their firms. 
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10. Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Overview of variables of the study 
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Appendix B: Outcomes of the likelihood-ratio test for overdispersion 
 
Table 6: Likelihood-ratio test for overdispersion 




 Interval]  Sig 
 CVC Deals 0.050 0.007 6.76 0.000 0.035 0.064 *** 
 Constant 6.524 0.075 86.92 0.000 6.377 6.671 *** 
 /lnalpha 0.570 0.053 .b .b 0.466 0.674  
  
Mean dependent var 1073.163 SD dependent var  1876.781 
Pseudo r-squared  0.010 Number of obs   498.000 
Chi-square   77.869 Prob > chi2  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 7672.717 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 7685.349 
 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) = 7.9e+05 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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Appendix C: Outcomes of the Hausman Specification Test 
 
Table 7: Hausman (1978) specification test  









CVC Deals 0.034 0.033 0.001067         0.0043536 
INV 0.048 0.043 0.005168 0.0041378 
INV*CVCDeals -0.009 -0.009 -0.000411         0.0011647 
GEO -0.042 -0.037 -0.005073         0.0045596 
GEO*CVCDeals -0.001 -0.001 -0.000278         0.0010579 
ROA 0.557 0.612 -0.054940         0.0563768 
R&D Intensity 0.828 0.937 -0.108790         0.0813359 
SIZE 0.001 0.001 -0.000143         0.0001418 
YearDum1 1.717 1.724 -0.006363          0.012457 
YearDum2 1.667 1.673 -0.005760         0.0122925 
YearDum3 1.671 1.675 -0.004430         0.0116217 
YearDum4 1.597 1.597 0.000062         0.0109373 
YearDum5 1.518 1.520 -0.001648         0.0111908 
YearDum6 1.432 1.435 -0.003175         0.0115711 
YearDum7 0.998 1.004 -0.006310          0.012148 
 
                          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtnbreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtnbreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(15) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
=      329.96 
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Appendix D: Model Specification - FE negative binomial regression 
 
Table 8: Model 1 - Conditional FE negative binomial regression  






 Interval]  Sig 
 ROA 0.516 0.371 1.39 0.164 -0.211 1.244  
 R&D Intensity 0.901 0.256 3.52 0.000 0.400 1.402 *** 
 SIZE 0.002 0.000 4.39 0.000 0.001 0.002 *** 
 YearDum1 1.682 0.087 19.37 0.000 1.512 1.852 *** 
 YearDum2 1.699 0.087 19.61 0.000 1.529 1.869 *** 
 YearDum3 1.710 0.086 19.84 0.000 1.541 1.879 *** 
 YearDum4 1.613 0.087 18.53 0.000 1.442 1.784 *** 
 YearDum5 1.519 0.088 17.26 0.000 1.346 1.691 *** 
 YearDum6 1.400 0.089 15.77 0.000 1.226 1.574 *** 
 YearDum7 0.977 0.093 10.53 0.000 0.795 1.158 *** 
 YearDum8 0.000 . . . . .  
 Constant 0.507 0.114 4.45 0.000 0.284 0.730 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 1114.360 SD dependent var   1829.842 
Number of obs   511.000 Chi-square   604.773 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 5545.127 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 9: Model 2 - Conditional FE negative binomial regression  
 






 Interval]  Sig 
 CVC Deals 0.007 0.003 2.17 0.030 0.001 0.014 ** 
 ROA 0.434 0.392 1.11 0.268 -0.334 1.202  
 R&D Intensity 0.881 0.226 3.89 0.000 0.437 1.324 *** 
 SIZE 0.001 0.000 2.36 0.018 0.000 0.002 ** 
 YearDum1 1.705 0.085 19.98 0.000 1.538 1.872 *** 
 YearDum2 1.668 0.085 19.54 0.000 1.500 1.835 *** 
 YearDum3 1.678 0.083 20.11 0.000 1.515 1.842 *** 
 YearDum4 1.599 0.084 19.13 0.000 1.435 1.762 *** 
 YearDum5 1.527 0.083 18.39 0.000 1.364 1.690 *** 
 YearDum6 1.437 0.084 17.08 0.000 1.272 1.602 *** 
 YearDum7 1.009 0.088 11.46 0.000 0.837 1.182 *** 
 YearDum8 0.000 . . . . .  
 Constant 0.860 0.125 6.89 0.000 0.616 1.105 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 1170.506 SD dependent var   1930.167 
Number of obs   419.000 Chi-square   607.029 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 4331.321 
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Table 10: Model 3 - Conditional FE negative binomial regression  
 






 Interval]  Sig 
 CVC Deals 0.031 0.014 2.30 0.021 0.005 0.058 ** 
 INV 0.053 0.030 1.80 0.072 -0.005 0.111 * 
 INV*CVCDeals -0.009 0.005 -1.78 0.074 -0.019 0.001 * 
 ROA 0.546 0.393 1.39 0.165 -0.224 1.317  
 R&D Intensity 0.837 0.230 3.63 0.000 0.386 1.288 *** 
 SIZE 0.001 0.000 2.07 0.039 0.000 0.002 ** 
 YearDum1 1.707 0.091 18.74 0.000 1.528 1.885 *** 
 YearDum2 1.657 0.090 18.37 0.000 1.480 1.833 *** 
 YearDum3 1.668 0.088 18.93 0.000 1.496 1.841 *** 
 YearDum4 1.588 0.088 18.04 0.000 1.415 1.760 *** 
 YearDum5 1.516 0.087 17.37 0.000 1.345 1.687 *** 
 YearDum6 1.428 0.088 16.26 0.000 1.256 1.600 *** 
 YearDum7 0.997 0.092 10.88 0.000 0.817 1.176 *** 
 YearDum8 0.000 . . . . .  
 Constant 0.736 0.150 4.89 0.000 0.441 1.031 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 1186.722 SD dependent var   1939.427 
Number of obs.   413.000 Chi-square   562.376 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 4276.953 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 11: Model 4 - Conditional FE negative binomial regression  
 






 Interval]  Sig 
 CVC Deals 0.034 0.024 1.43 0.153 -0.013 0.080  
 INV 0.048 0.030 1.58 0.114 -0.011 0.107  
 INV*CVCDeals -0.009 0.005 -1.72 0.085 -0.019 0.001 * 
 GEO -0.042 0.037 -1.13 0.257 -0.115 0.031  
 GEO*CVCDeals -0.001 0.006 -0.15 0.880 -0.012 0.011  
 ROA 0.557 0.396 1.41 0.159 -0.218 1.332  
 R&D Intensity 0.828 0.229 3.62 0.000 0.380 1.276 *** 
 SIZE 0.001 0.000 2.10 0.036 0.000 0.002 ** 
 YearDum1 1.717 0.092 18.75 0.000 1.538 1.897 *** 
 YearDum2 1.667 0.091 18.41 0.000 1.490 1.845 *** 
 YearDum3 1.671 0.088 18.95 0.000 1.498 1.843 *** 
 YearDum4 1.597 0.088 18.08 0.000 1.424 1.770 *** 
 YearDum5 1.518 0.087 17.38 0.000 1.347 1.689 *** 
 YearDum6 1.432 0.088 16.30 0.000 1.260 1.604 *** 
 YearDum7 0.998 0.092 10.90 0.000 0.819 1.177 *** 
 YearDum8 0.000 . . . . .  
 Constant 0.848 0.184 4.60 0.000 0.487 1.208 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 1186.722 SD dependent var   1939.427 
Number of obs   413.000 Chi-square   567.355 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 4279.168 
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Appendix E: Magnitude Analysis via Incident Rate Ratios 
 
Table 12: Incidence rate ratios 






 Interval]  Sig 
 CVC Deals 1.0344 0.024 1.43 0.153 0.988 1.083  
 INV 1.0491 0.032 1.58 0.114 0.989 1.113  
 INV*CVCDeals 0.9910 0.005 -1.72 0.085 0.981 1.001 * 
 GEO 0.9587 0.036 -1.13 0.257 0.891 1.031  
 GEO*CVCDeals 0.9991 0.006 -0.15 0.880 0.988 1.011  
 ROA 1.7452 0.690 1.41 0.159 0.804 3.790  
 R&D Intensity 2.2892 0.523 3.62 0.000 1.463 3.583 *** 
 SIZE 1.0009 0.000 2.10 0.036 1.000 1.002 ** 
 YearDum1 5.5703 0.510 18.75 0.000 4.655 6.666 *** 
 YearDum2 5.2966 0.480 18.41 0.000 4.435 6.325 *** 
 YearDum3 5.3149 0.469 18.95 0.000 4.472 6.317 *** 
 YearDum4 4.9367 0.436 18.08 0.000 4.152 5.870 *** 
 YearDum5 4.5621 0.398 17.38 0.000 3.845 5.414 *** 
 YearDum6 4.1870 0.368 16.30 0.000 3.525 4.974 *** 
 YearDum7 2.7124 0.248 10.90 0.000 2.267 3.245 *** 
 YearDum8 1.0000 . . . . .  
 Constant 2.3338 0.430 4.60 0.000 1.627 3.348 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 1186.722 SD dependent var   1939.427 
Number of obs   413.000 Chi-square   567.355 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 4279.168 
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